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NOTE
TIKTOK MIGHT STOP: WHY THE
IEEPA CANNOT REGULATE
PERSONAL DATA PRIVACY AND
THE NEED FOR A
COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION
ALICIA FAISON∗
INTRODUCTION
In Spring 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic shuttered most
entertainment outside the home, millions of Americans downloaded
their new favorite productivity drain: TikTok. The app, which has
accumulated more than 100 million monthly users across the United
States,1 allows users to watch and share 60-second videos on virtually
any topic. As they scroll through their homepages, users see videos that
reflect their preferences, which are identified by TikTok’s algorithm.
Although TikTok purports to “inspire creativity,”2 some U.S.
lawmakers see a much more insidious motive: capture consumers’
personal data3 for use by hostile foreign governments.4 Because
Copyright © 2021 Alicia Faison.
∗
J.D. Candidate, Duke Law School, Class of 2022.
1. Alex Sherman, TikTok Reveals Detailed User Number for the First Time, CNBC (Aug.
24, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/24/tiktok-reveals-us-global-user-growth-numbers-forfirst-time.html.
2. About TikTok, TIKTOK, https://www.tiktok.com/about?lang=en (last visited Mar. 5,
2021).
3. “Personal data” or “personal information” has a broad definition. Throughout this Note,
I refer to personal data as any information which identifies or could be linked to an individual or
their household. See, e.g., California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN.
OF CAL., https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa (last visited Nov. 3, 2020) (“For example, [personal data]
could include your name, social security number, email address, records of products purchased,
internet browsing history, geolocation data, fingerprints, and inferences from other personal
information that could create a profile about your preferences and characteristics.”).
4. See Jack Nicas et al., TikTok Said to Be Under National Security Review, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/01/technology/tiktok-national-securityreview.html (describing national security review of Bytedance acquisition of Musical.ly, a TikTok
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TikTok’s parent company, Bytedance, is based in the People’s Republic
of China, legislators are concerned that Chinese law compels the
platform to share user data with the Chinese government.5 TikTok
concedes that it collects user data, but maintains that the data is held
on U.S.-based servers and is not shared with any government officials.6
Despite TikTok’s reassurances, a U.S. Department of Defense memo
sent to various military agencies in December 2019 noted a “potential
risk associated with the TikTok app” and advised military personnel to
delete it.7
Interestingly, TikTok uses the same data mining practices as many
other companies.8 The threat TikTok allegedly poses—that, as a
Chinese company, it could be compelled to share information with the
Chinese government—is shared by many popular gaming platforms.9
These platforms, which produce widely used video games like Fortnite,
are also created by Chinese companies and similarly collect user data.10
Further, the concerns about TikTok say nothing of the risk that the
Chinese government could acquire Americans’ personal data by other
means, like hacking into U.S. databases or legally buying data from data
brokers.11
Despite the apparent ordinariness of TikTok’s data practices, on
August 6, 2020, President Trump issued an executive order banning the
app, asserting that TikTok’s data mining practices “threaten the

precursor); see also, Christopher Wray, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Address at the Hudson
Institute: The Threat Posed by the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party to
the Economic and National Security of the United States (July 7, 2020) (“The greatest long-term
threat to our nation’s information and intellectual property, and to our economic vitality, is the
counterintelligence and economic espionage threat from China. It’s a threat to our economic
security—and by extension, to our national security.”).
5. Letter from Sen. Charles E. Schumer & Sen. Tom Cotton to Joseph Maguire, Acting
Dir. of National Intelligence (Oct. 23, 2019) (on file with United States Senate).
6. See Privacy Policy, TIKTOK, https://www.tiktok.com/legal/privacy-policy?lang=en (last
updated Dec. 20, 2020) (explaining that Tiktok collects usage information, device information,
location data, messages, metadata, and cookies).
7. Neil Vigdor, U.S. Military Branches Block Access to TikTok App Amid Pentagon
Warning, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/04/us/tiktok-pentagonmilitary-ban.html.
8. Keman Huang & Stuart Madnick, The TikTok Ban Should Worry Every Company,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 28, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/08/the-tiktok-ban-should-worry-everycompany.
9. Aynne Kokas, China Already Has Your Data. Trump’s Tiktok and Wechat Bans Can’t
POST
(Aug.
11,
2020),
Stop
That.,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/08/11/tiktok-wechat-bans-ineffective/.
10. Id.
11. See infra Part II.
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national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.”12
Since the announcement was made, the move has been harshly
criticized as a political distraction that infringes on the First
Amendment rights of TikTok’s users,13 and alternatively, praised for
confronting Chinese data collection tactics.14 Whether a ban will
actually take effect is a different question, as the Biden Administration
indicated it might drop the issue entirely.15
Although TikTok is the cybersecurity16 controversy de rigueur, the
debate about its data mining practices reflects more fundamental
questions about the governance of our personal data: Is personal data
privacy truly a national security concern? If so, how should we regulate
it?
Ineffective personal data privacy regulation poses a grave national
security risk—namely, that our data could be misused by hostile actors.
However, protection of personal data cannot be successfully
implemented through ad hoc maneuvering like the TikTok ban.
Instead, effective protection requires comprehensive legislation that
addresses what data is allowed to be collected, and what companies can
do with it.
Although President Trump seemed to agree that personal data
security is of paramount concern, his approach to addressing the issue
is ultimately untenable.17 In imposing the ban on TikTok, the
President’s Executive Order cited to powers granted under the

12. Exec. Order No. 13942, 85 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (Aug. 11, 2020).
13. Mike Isaac & David McCabe, TikTok Wins Repreive from U.S. Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/27/technology/tiktok-ban-ruling-app.html.
14. James Jay Carafono, Why Trump’s TikTok Battle With China Is Worth Fighting,
HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.heritage.org/cybersecurity/commentary/whytrumps-tiktok-battle-china-worth-fighting.
15. See Unopposed Motion to Hold Appeal in Abeyance at 2, Marland v. Trump, No. 204597, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202572, at *38–39 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2020), appeal docketed sub nom
Marland v. Biden, No. 20-3322 (3d Cir. Feb. 10, 2021) (The Department of Justice moved to stay
the case pending in the Third Circuit after the Trump Administration’s claims were dismissed and
appealed); see also Tiktok Inc. v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-02658, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177250, at *3
(D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2020) (dismissing the Trump Administration’s case against TikTok).
16. By “cybersecurity,” I refer broadly to the frameworks that protect data. See also Dan
Craigen et al., Defining Cybersecurity, 4 TECH. INNOVATION MGMT. REV. 13, 13 (discussing
various definitions of cybersecurity).
17. See Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), TWITTER (Aug. 23, 2019, 11:58 AM),
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?dates=%5B%222019-08-23%22%2C%222019-0824%22%5D (“For all the Fake News Reporters that don’t have a clue as to what the law is relative
to Presidential powers, China, etc., try looking at the Emergency Economic Powers Act of
1977. Case closed!”).
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International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA).18
The IEEPA empowers the President to impose economic sanctions to
confront “any unusual or extraordinary threat” to national security that
has its origins outside the U.S.19 The President may exercise these
powers after he declares a national emergency in accordance with the
National Emergencies Act (NEA).20
Congress originally enacted the IEEPA to provide a check on
executive power.21 In doing so, Congress defined three limitations on
the President’s authority. First, the powers under the statute may only
be invoked during times of national emergency.22 According to a House
Report on the IEEPA, national emergencies are “rare and brief, and
are not to be equated with normal ongoing problems.”23 The second
limitation gave Congress the power to review and terminate the
national emergency.24 Congress was to meet every six months to discuss
whether to veto the President’s executive order declaring emergency.25
The third constraint precluded regulation of “personal
communications” or “informational materials” under the IEEPA,26
which include films, photographs, CD-ROMs, etc.27
Despite these efforts to limit executive power, the IEEPA is now
being used contrary to its legislative intent. Over time, Presidents have
used IEEPA powers expansively and with greater frequency to further
foreign policy objectives.28 Further, Supreme Court decisions
18.
19.
20.
21.

Exec. Order No. 13942, 85 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (Aug. 11, 2020).
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–08 (2018).
National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–51 (2018).
CHRISTOPER A. CASEY ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45618, THE INTERNATIONAL
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND USE 6–9 (2020).
22. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(b).
23. H.R. REP. NO. 95-459, at 10 (1977).
24. 50 U.S.C. § 1706(b).
25. 50 U.S.C. § 1706(d); see also Harold H. Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins
in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1264 (1988) (“Congress
drafted IEEPA specifically to narrow the President’s authority in nonwartime situations,
conditioning his exercise of emergency powers upon prior congressional consultation, subsequent
review, and legislative veto termination provisions.”).
26. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b).
27. Id.
28. CASEY ET AL., supra note 21, at 17; see also id. at 52–53, 60–63 (comparing President
Reagan’s declaration of four national emergencies to President Obama’s eleven throughout their
respective presidency); see also Gregory Korte, White House: States of Emergency are Just
TODAY
(Apr.
9,
2015),
Formalities,
USA
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/04/09/pro-forma-states-of-nationalemergency/25479553/ (noting that after President Obama froze Venezuelan assets under the
IEEPA, the administration later admitted that Venezuela did not pose a threat to the U.S. at all,
and the national emergency declaration was merely a formality).
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undermined Congress’s oversight mechanisms and declared the
legislative veto invalid.29 The Court upheld the President’s broad
authority under the IEEPA,30 reflecting the well-established belief that
foreign affairs are primarily the province of the executive branch.31
In banning TikTok under the IEEPA, the Trump Administration
evinces an overreach of executive power—the kind that the IEEPA
intended to prevent. Indeed, it seems odd that the IEEPA could be
invoked to oppose foreign adversaries that are “increasingly creating
and exploiting vulnerabilities in information and communications
technology and services . . . in order to commit . . . economic and
industrial espionage against the United States and its people.”32 By the
Trump Administration’s own definition, then, the security issues posed
by TikTok are neither rare nor brief.33
Therefore, it is invalid to use the IEEPA to regulate threats to
Americans’ personal data. First, these risks are not extraordinary
national emergencies at all. Instead, these are known, widespread
national security threats that require more comprehensive solutions.
Second, the ban on TikTok violates the IEEPA carve-out on
informational materials. Finally, given the extensiveness of the personal
data security risk, Congress should have a greater role in regulation
than an IEEPA framework would allow. Accordingly, this Note argues
that personal data security cannot be adequately regulated through the
framework mandated by the IEEPA, and instead requires a broad,
long-term solution.
Part I will survey prior efforts to address personal data privacy in
the U.S. to show how inattention to the risks posed by personal data
collection created a fractured privacy framework ripe for exploitation.
Part II will examine the widespread risks inherent in the personal data
marketplace and will demonstrate the need for an ongoing resolution

29. See generally Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (upholding use of emergency powers
against Cuba pursuant to the IEEPA); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating
the legislative veto); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (giving broad
interpretation to the President’s IEEPA authorities).
30. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
31. See Koh, supra note 25, at 1305 (“Whether on the merits or on justiciability grounds, the
courts
have held for the President in [foreign affairs] cases with astonishing regularity.”).
32. Exec. Order No. 13873, 84 Fed. Reg. 22,689 (May 17, 2019) (emphasis added).
33. See Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction at 5, TikTok Inc. v. Trump, No. 1:20-CV-2658-CJN (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2020) (describing
China as a “persistent” and “growing” threat).
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to those national security threats. Part III will argue that application of
the IEEPA is inappropriate to regulate personal data privacy; the
statute is not designed to bear on events that are not a “state of
emergency,” exempts personal communications and informational
materials from its reach, and improperly limits Congress’s role. Part IV
will suggest that comprehensive congressional legislation is needed,
and looks to California’s Data Privacy legislation as a model for a
federal data protection law.
I. PATCHWORK PROTECTION: DATA PRIVACY IN THE UNITED
STATES
This Part provides an overview of the security risks posed by
inadequate personal data protection law. However, it is important to
first understand the existing data privacy framework in the United
States. This Part begins by surveying the judicial approach to privacy
and the patchwork of federal data protection legislation. Prior
administrations’ cybersecurity efforts misunderstood the scope of the
national security problem, leaving significant gaps in the protection of
our personal data. Partially as a result of the U.S. government’s
response, inadequate data protection policy continues to pose the risk
that our personal data may be used to benefit our adversaries.
Cambridge Analytica’s interference in the 2016 election exemplified
this danger.
A. U.S. Data Privacy: Judicial Interpretation and Federal Legislative
Framework
Neither the courts nor Congress have created robust privacy
protection in the United States. Unlike the courts of other countries,
the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to recognize an informational
privacy right in the Constitution,34 affording constitutional protection
only to privacy invasions by the government, rather than by private,
hostile actors.35 Some judicial theorists believe that a constitutional
right to informational privacy does not exist in any context.36
To the extent an informational privacy right might exist in the U.S.,

34. See STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45631, DATA PROTECTION
LAW: AN OVERVIEW 5 (2019) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)) (noting that
the Fourth Amendment is not read to protect a “general” right to privacy).
35. Id.
36. See NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 160 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“A federal
constitutional right to ‘informational privacy’ does not exist.”).
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it only extends to criminal law. In Carpenter v. United States, the
Supreme Court determined whether police could use location tracking
records from a suspect’s cell phone without a warrant.37 The Court
concluded that the Fourth Amendment protects a reasonable
expectation of privacy, and allowing government access to location
tracking data “contravenes that expectation.”38 Although Carpenter
acknowledges a distinction between privacy in a digital context and
traditional forms of privacy, the Court’s relative indifference to
informational privacy has changed little in the digital age.
Congress has enacted a limited number of personal informational
privacy measures, creating a discordant patchwork of protections that
leave significant areas unregulated.39 Only a few major pieces of
legislation actually impose data protection requirements on database
operators, in addition to requiring consumer consent for sharing data.
Of note, the Communications Act of 1934, and its amendments in 1996,
impose data security requirements on “common carriers,” namely,
telephone services, cable operators and satellite carriers.40 The
Graham-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) imposes obligations on financial
institutions to protect consumer personal information.41 Similarly, the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
requires health care providers to protect patients’ personal health
information and adopt privacy standards.42 However, these measures
have been criticized for offering too many loopholes that allow
dissemination of personal information to third parties by recordkeepers.43 Other legislation, like the Fair Credit Reporting Act, does not
impose any restrictions on the maintenance of information, but rather
imposes only consumer disclosure requirements.44
The agencies tasked with enforcement of these provisions, the
37. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212, 2216 (2018).
38. Id. at 2217.
39. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 587 (2014) (“The statutory law regulating privacy is diffuse and
discordant . . . . This sectoral approach also leaves large areas unregulated . . . .”).
40. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); 47 U.S.C. § 153(51).
41. Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2018).
42. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
43. See R. Bradley McMahon, After Billions Spent to Comply with HIPAA and GLBA
Privacy Provisions, Why Is Identity Theft the Most Prevalent Crime in America, 49 VILL. L. REV.
625, 651 (2004) (“Both laws, however,
contain loopholes that allow entities to disseminate personal information.”).
44. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2018).
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Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB), enjoy broad discretion to implement these
requirements.45 But the fact remains that most U.S. citizens have little
control over what personal data is collected, who can access their data,
and how third parties can use it.46
B. Presidential Efforts to Address Cybersecurity
This piecemeal legislation makes more sense when considered
against the backdrop of the federal government’s slow acceptance of
the cybersecurity risk. In particular, the government’s failure to
recognize the danger of inadequate protection of personal, rather than
governmental, data led to the data security incidents we see today.
In 1996, President Clinton enacted Executive Order 13,010, titled
Critical Infrastructure Protection.47 This Order was one of the first
national acknowledgements of a “cyber threat,” defined as a
“computer-based attack[] on the information or communications
components that control critical infrastructures.”48 E.O. 13,010
established a commission to report on and recommend resolutions to
cyber threats on governmental data.49 Although the Clinton
Administration did not address personal data beyond the enactment of
the GLBA and HIPPA, President Clinton’s efforts were not without
some benefit. Importantly, the Clinton Administration classified the
cyber threat as a national security issue, of the same importance as a
physical attack. Recognition of these national security implications
encouraged subsequent administrations to prioritize the issue.
Initially, the Bush Administration seemed poised to continue
building on the Clinton’s Administration’s cyber framework, but 9/11
changed everything. Where the Clinton Administration believed the
cyber threat could be as serious as a physical attack, after 9/11 the Bush
Administration, unsurprisingly, refocused national security policy on
physical threats.50 As a result, the Bush Administration’s efforts to
45. See MULLIGAN, supra note 34, at 30, 35 (noting that the FTC covers a “broad range” of
activity and the CFPB may take “any” action to prevent covered entities from engaging in
deceptive practices).
46. See id. at 55 (proposed legislation may afford citizens the legal right to “control the use
and dissemination of personal data . . . [and require companies to define] how data is
disseminated or disclosed to third parties”).
47. Exec. Order No. 13010, 61 Fed. Reg. 37347 (Jul. 15, 1996).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Kevin P. Newmeyer, Who Should Lead U.S. Cybersecurity Efforts?, 3 PRISM 115, 117
(2012).
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regulate personal data security were minimal in comparison to its
broader national security efforts.
Nonetheless, the Bush Administration did implement some data
security policies. In 2003, it issued a report titled the National Strategy
to Secure Cyberspace.51 The report identified cybersecurity as a key
national security issue but still recommended that the federal
government take a backseat to private efforts: “[F]ederal regulation
will not become a primary means of securing cyberspace . . . the market
itself is expected to provide the major impetus to improve
cybersecurity.”52 Additionally, in 2008, the Bush Administration
established the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative
(CNCI), a set of projects which aimed to reduce online security
vulnerabilities, protect against intrusions, and anticipate future cyberattacks.53
Neither of those efforts proved sufficient. The 2003 Report
dangerously mischaracterized the proper role of the national
government by yielding control of the issue to private companies. As
critics of the 2003 Report realized, in no other area of national security
does the government rely almost exclusively on market forces or
private efforts.54 In turn, the 2008 CNCI went too far in the other
direction—it was heavily classified and its only focus was on protection
of government data (“.gov” protection).55
The Obama Administration, on the other hand, prioritized data
privacy as a national security issue. The administration expanded the
focus of federal privacy protection, encompassing not just
governmental security, but personal data security as well. Almost
immediately after taking office, President Obama implemented a sixtyday review of U.S. cybersecurity policy.56 The review culminated in a
51. WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE 15 (2003),
available at https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cyberspace_strategy.pdf.
52. Id.
53. JOHN ROLLINS & ANNA C. HENNING, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40427, COMPREHENSIVE
NAT’L CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE: LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 1
(2009).
54. See CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, SECURING CYBERSPACE FOR THE 44TH
PRESIDENCY: REP. OF THE CSIS COMMISSION ON CYBERSECURITY FOR THE 44TH PRESIDENCY
50 (2008) (“In pursuing the laudable goal of avoiding overregulation, the strategy essentially
abandoned cyber defense to ad hoc market forces. . . . In no other area of national security do we
depend on private, voluntary efforts.”).
55. See id. at 15 (“The CNCI has its focus on defending government—.gov, in other words—
an approach that skilled opponents will be able to outflank.”).
56. FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW: ASSURING A TRUSTED AND
RESILIENT INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE iii (2009), available at
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ten-point action plan to strengthen federal policy for both personal and
governmental protection.57 During President Obama’s time in office,
the administration delivered on most of the goals of the action plan.
First, President Obama tasked a cybersecurity czar, Howard Schmidt,
with developing a national cyber policy.58 The Obama Administration
improved coordination among federal agencies, delineating the
appropriate roles for the DHS, the FBI, and the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence in the wake of a cyber-attack.59 The National
Institute of Standards and Technology (a division of the Department of
Commerce) improved public-private cybersecurity relationships by
developing industry-best practices for cybersecurity management,
which were widely implemented by the private sector.60
Despite these steps forward, the Obama Administration failed to
implement the comprehensive personal data privacy policy they had
envisioned. The centerpiece of the Obama Administration’s data
privacy legislation, a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, did not gain
traction in Congress. Unlike the Bush Administration’s efforts, the
Privacy Bill of Rights posited that consumer privacy was a fundamental
right that could not be left in the hands of industry.61 The proposal was
nevertheless decried by privacy advocates as insufficient. Conversely,
technology companies characterized it as unduly burdensome.62
President Obama’s term ended shortly after an unprecedented
cyber intrusion on one of our nation’s most vital institutions: fair and
free elections. In 2010, Facebook launched OpenGraph, a service that

https://fas.org/irp/eprint/cyber-review.pdf.
57. Id. at vi.
58. Larry Greenmeier, Obama Chooses Howard Schmidt to Coordinate National
AM.
(Dec.
22,
2009),
Cybersecurity,
SCI.
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/obama-chooses-howard-schmidt-tocoordinate-national-cybersecurity/.
59. Travis D. Howard & Jose de Arimateia da Cruz, Stay the Course: Why Trump Must
Build on Obama’s Cybersecurity Policy, 26 INFO. SEC. J.: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 276, 277
(2017).
60. See id. For example, NIST recommended a five-step framework for responding to cyber
incidents—Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH.,
FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY 4 (2014),
available
at
https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurityframework-021214.pdf.
61. See WHITE HOUSE, ADMINISTRATION DISCUSSION DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL
OF RIGHTS ACT (2015) (“The Congress finds that . . . Americans cherish privacy as an element of
their individual freedom.”).
62. Brendan Sasso, Obama’s ‘Privacy Bill of Rights’ Gets Bashed from All Sides, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/02/obamas-privacy-bill-ofrights-gets-bashed-from-all-sides/456576/.
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allowed external app developers to reach out to Facebook users for
access to their—and crucially, their Facebook friends’—personal
information.63 In 2013, the research company GlobalScienceResearch,
in collaboration with political consulting firm Cambridge Analytica,
created an app that prompted users to answer questions for a
psychological profile.64 By participating, a user gave Cambridge
Analytica access to her and her friends’ personal information.65
Although Facebook removed OpenGraph’s access to friends’ data in
2014, the rule did not apply retroactively.66 So, from an initial 270,000
people who took the quiz, Cambridge Analytica amassed data on 87
million Facebook profiles.67 In 2016, Cambridge Analytica passed that
data to the presidential campaigns of Donald Trump and Ted Cruz,
which allegedly used the data to develop intensive voter profiles and
target political advertisements to Facebook users.68 Cambridge
Analytica may have also passed data to Russia, which interfered in the
general election in favor of President Trump.69
The Cambridge Analytica scandal, more than anything, epitomizes
the dangers of inadequate personal data protections. Although hacking
of government systems may be a real threat, prior administrations’
singular focus on that issue demonstrates a failure to understand the
breadth of the national security problem. Efforts like the Obama
Administration’s Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights would have
ultimately permitted tech companies to take whatever data they
wanted, but imposed restrictions on its distribution.70 Thus, even

63. See Sam Meredith, Facebook-Cambridge Analytica: A Timeline of the Data Hijacking
Scandal, CNBC (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/10/facebook-cambridgeanalytica-a-timeline-of-the-data-hijacking-scandal.html (“If accepted, these apps would then
have access to a user’s name, gender, location, birthday, education, political preferences,
relationship status, religious views, online chat status and more. In fact, with additional
permissions, external sites could also gain access to a person’s private messages.”).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Matthew Rosenberg et al., How Trump Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of
Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridgeanalytica-trump-campaign.html; Cecilia Kang & Sheera Frankel, Facebook Says Cambridge
Analytica Harvested Data of Up to 87 Million Users, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/technology/mark-zuckerberg-testify-congress.html.
68. Id.
69. Danny Hakim & Matthew Rosenberg, Data Firm Tied to Trump Campaign Talked
TIMES
(Mar.
17,
2018),
Business
with
Russians,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-russia.html.
70. See Sasso, supra note 62 (“Instead, companies and industry associations would write
their own rules and then ask the FTC to sign off on them.”).
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measures specifically meant to protect personal data failed to target the
real problem: Allowing expansive data mining increases the risk that
data will be used to benefit our adversaries.
II. TIKTOK IS NOT UNIQUE: PERVASIVE THREATS POSED BY THE
MARKETPLACE FOR PERSONAL DATA
Although the United States recognized early on that cybersecurity
could become a major national security issue and instituted policies
protecting governmental data, policymakers failed to appreciate the
risk created by personal data mining. Thus, personal data security
efforts to date have been inadequate.71
This brings us back to TikTok. Although TikTok is accused of
mining personal data for the benefit of the Chinese government, the
national security risk that TikTok poses—that Americans’ personal
data can end up in the hands of a foreign government—is hardly unique
to TikTok.72 Thus, this Part will describe how the marketplace for
personal data creates ongoing cyber threats that cannot be ameliorated
by banning one company outright, because hostile actors can acquire
data in other ways.
Generally, there are three ways that personal data could be
acquired by a foreign government. First is the accusation levied against
TikTok: that any foreign company requesting personal data could be
compelled to give that data to their government. Second, systems
storing personal data could be hacked. Finally, some companies could
be selling personal data to hostile actors.
No matter how it is acquired, Americans’ personal data in the
possession of a hostile foreign government poses a threat to our
national security. There are many specific consequences of hostile
actors’ acquisition of personal data, including the spread of propaganda
in an effort to influence American elections and use of personal data
to extort, blackmail, and even recruit U.S. citizens to share confidential
government information. These consequences demonstrate why
protecting our personal data demands a comprehensive national
solution.
71. See SUSAN A. AARONSON, DATA IS DANGEROUS: COMPARING THE RISKS THAT THE
UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND GERMANY SEE IN DATA TROVES 8 (2020) (“[N]etizens of the
United States have little recourse to ensure that their personal data does not put them or their
fellow Americans at risk.”).
72. Graham Webster, The Risks TikTok Poses Are Not At All Unique to TikTok, SLATE
(Aug. 3, 2020), https://slate.com/technology/2020/08/tiktok-ban-microsoft-trump-china-risk.html.
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A. TikTok and Other Companies Can Be Compelled to Share Data
The fear that TikTok or other foreign-based companies operating
in the U.S. could be compelled to pass off users’ data to China or
elsewhere is legitimate.73 For example, China’s Cybersecurity Law
requires Chinese companies to “provide technical support and
assistance to public security organs and national security organs that
are safeguarding national security and investigating criminal activities
in accordance with the law.”74 Although what constitutes compliance is
unclear and often results in protracted negotiations, the fact remains
that the Chinese government can acquire effectively any information it
wants.75 Likewise, apps developed in Russia pose the same threat.76
B. Collection of Personal Data and Risk of Hack
The risks associated with foreign governments compelling access to
data, however, presents only a small portion of the overarching
personal data security concern. The real threat resides in the mass
collection of personal consumer information—known today as “big
data.”
To understand the ubiquity of technology companies’ data mining
practices, it is important to understand the personal data marketplace.
Personal data refers to the mass of data about an individual that
different technologies collect every day. For example, Facebook collects
user data not only from an indvidual’s Facebook activity, but also
through partnerships with other major technology companies, such as
Spotify, Netflix, Amazon, etc.77 The result is a nearly symbiotic
relationship: Facebook collects data from Amazon using cookies, which
informs how Facebook presents information to users, which, in turn,
informs Amazon’s targeted advertising strategy for a given user.78 In
73. See Dangerous Partners: Big Tech & Beijng: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime &
Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 2 (2020) (statement of Samm Sacks,
Senior Fellow, Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center) (“[T]he way Chinese companies
handle U.S. citizen data does impact U.S. national security.”).
74. Id. at 4.
75. Id. at 7.
76. See Letter from Jill C. Tyson, Assistant Director, Office of Congressional Affairs,
Federal Bureau of Investigation to Sen. Charles E. Schumer (Nov. 25, 2019) (on file with United
States Senate) (“The FBI considers any mobile application or similar product developed in
Russia, such as FaceApp, to be a potential counterintelligence threat . . . .”)
77. See Gabriel J.X. Dance et al., As Facebook Raised a Privacy Wall, it Carved an Opening
TIMES
(Dec.
18,
2018),
for
Tech
Giants,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/technology/facebook-privacy.html
(reporting
that
Facebook allowed technology companies expansive access to user data).
78. Id.
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general, technology companies use this collection of personal data to
create a more personalized user experience.
These scraps of data are oftentimes packaged and resold by data
brokers, which are companies that aggregate users’ personal data to
build a composite of their lives.79 Data brokers collect information from
publicly available sources (e.g., property records), social media, other
data brokers and commercial sources,80 and then build profiles based
on that data, categorizing those profiles into different segments.81 As an
FTC Report detailed
[I]n developing their products, the data brokers use not only the raw
data they obtain from these sources, such as a person’s name,
address, home ownership status, or age, but also certain derived data,
which they infer about consumers. For example, a data broker might
infer that an individual with a boating license has an interest in
boating, that a consumer has a technology interest based on the
purchase of a “Wired” magazine subscription, or that a consumer
who has bought two Ford cars has loyalty to that brand.82

These inferences are then used to package consumer information
for marketing, risk mitigation and people-search products.83 Data
brokers collect and store information on nearly every American
household and the industry is estimated to be worth $200 billion.84
Whether we know it or not, data brokers are keeping tabs on all of us.
This mass data collection creates the inherent risk that these
systems, maintained by data brokers and other companies, could be
hacked by a foreign state actor. The consequences of a data breach are
severe: In 2017, Equifax, a credit-reporting agency that also functions as

79. FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY iv (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokerscall-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf.
80. Id. at 11–15.
81. Id. at 19.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 23. “Risk mitigation” refers to fraud detection products. For example, a risk
mitigation product might flag a customer using a fraudulent social security to apply for a credit
card. “People search products” are tools consumers might use to conduct a search on, for example,
a particular person or address. Popular providers include Spokeo and ZoomInfo. See Steven
Melendez & Alex Pasternack, Here Are the Data Brokers Quietly Buying and Selling Your
Personal Information, FAST CO. (Mar. 2, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90310803/hereare-the-data-brokers-quietly-buying-and-selling-your-personal-information (discussing data
broker products).
84. Matthew Crain, The Limits of Transparency: Data Brokers and Commodification, 20
NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 88, 90 (2018).
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one of the country’s largest data brokers, was hacked, exposing the data
of 145 million Americans.85 Four members of China’s military were
later indicted for the hacking.86 Equifax was just one example of the
growing use of data hacks. As attack technology advances, foreign
nations leverage their expertise and resources to gain advantage over
U.S. systems.87 The statistics corroborate the increasing ease of hacks:
The number of data breaches grows every year,88 and since the
beginning of 2010, there have been an estimated 40,650 personal data
hacks.89
One might reasonably think that these companies could impose
cybersecurity measures sufficient to guard against a data breach.
However, some mistakes cannot be mitigated by even the best
cybersecurity infrastructure. Human error, like failing to install a
security patch, can open the door to a mass data breach that affects
millions.90 So long as companies continue to collect and store personal
data, the risk of a hack will persist.
C. Selling Data and the Risk of Sales to Foreign Governments
The sale of personal data is another major risk about which
consumers are often unaware.91 Consider, for example, the
consequences of sending a vial of saliva to 23andMe, a DNA processing
service. When 23andMe users click “I DO CONSENT” at the bottom
of the company privacy policy, as do 80 percent of 23andMe’s customer
base, they permit GlaxoSmithKline, a pharmaceutical manufacturer, to
view the information gleaned from their saliva and to use that data in
85. Katie Benner, U.S. Charges Chinese Military Officers in 2017 Equifax Hacking, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/10/us/politics/equifax-hack-china.html.
86. Id.
87. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-622, HIGH RISK SERIES: URGENT
ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO ADDRESS CYBERSECURITY CHALLENGES FACING THE NATION 1, 2
(2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/694355.pdf (noting that “rapid developments in new
technologies” have given sophisticated foreign nations the expertise needed to impose “increasing
risks”).
88. Chris Morris, Hackers Had a Banner Year in 2019, FORTUNE (Jan. 28, 2020),
https://fortune.com/2020/01/28/2019-data-breach-increases-hackers/.
89. Megan Leonhardt, The 10 Biggest Data Hacks of the Decade, CNBC (Dec. 27, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/23/the-10-biggest-data-hacks-of-the-decade.html.
90. See Benner, supra note 85 (noting that the Equifax hack was due to a failure to install a
security patch).
91. See Your Data Is Shared and Sold. . .What’s Being Done About It?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Oct. 29, 2019), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/datashared-sold-whats-done/# (stating that “[u]p to 73% of American adults incorrectly believe that
the existence of a privacy policy means a website cannot share their data with other parties
without their permission”).
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drug development.92
Although 23andMe discloses where your data ends up, data brokers
do not.93 Thus, in the context of personal data sales, data brokers are
particularly risky. Data brokers are different from something like
Facebook, which encounters a certain amount of scrutiny because of its
notoriety and size. In contrast, data brokers operate in the shadows—
they collect data without consumer knowledge, make inferences about
the data, and sell the data to largely unknown customers.94 Although
some data brokers screen their customers to ensure above-the-board
data use, there is no law defining who can and cannot buy these mass
collections of data.95
This lack of transparency means that hostile actors could purchase
personal information from data brokers. Recent history shows these
security concerns are well-founded. In 2014, the data broker LeapLab
bought payday loan applications that included consumers’ names,
addresses, phone numbers, employers, Social Security numbers, and
bank account numbers.96 LeapLab sold that information to Ideal
Financial Solutions, which used the consumer information to make
millions of dollars in phony purchases.97
If there is no regulatory mechanism preventing personal data sales
to Ideal Financial, there is certainly nothing stopping the Chinese
government, or any other foreign government for that matter, from
buying Americans’ data through data brokers.98 In that sense, there is
no material difference between sharing data under foreign national
security law and buying it on the open market.

92. See Megan Molteni, 23andMe’s Pharma Deals Have Been the Plan All Along, WIRED
(Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/23andme-glaxosmithkline-pharma-deal/ (describing
how 23andMe develops biological insights from a customer’s saliva, such as predisposition to
disease, which is then passed on to GlaxoSmithKline to determine targets for drug development).
93. See Crain, supra note 84, at 91 (describing the information asymmetry between a general
public that is “increasingly [subject to] extensive forms of monitoring” and the “institutions doing
the monitoring [that remain] hidden from view”).
94. Id.
95. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 79, at 40–41.
96. FTC v. Ideal Fin. Sols., Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00143-JAD-GWF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
86348, at *9 (D. Nev. June 29, 2015).
97. Id.
98. See Dymples Leong & Teo-Yi-Ling, Data Brokers: A Weak Link in National Security,
THE DIPLOMAT (Aug. 21, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/data-brokers-a-weak-link-innational-security/ (“American companies can still sell data to third-party data brokers, even after
buying ownership of foreign-based apps. Those brokers could then turn around and sell the data
to the Chinese government.”).
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D. The Consequences of Data Acquisition
To some, the fact that foreign governments can easily acquire
Americans’ personal data is self-evidently terrifying. Others might ask,
“so what?” Although foreign actors’ goals in harvesting American data
may not be entirely clear at first, recent history provides some answers.
First, as discussed in Part I, personal data could be used to infiltrate
and corrupt American elections through the spread of disinformation.99
By combining different sets of data, Cambridge Analytica researchers
developed a method to “microtarget” individuals, allowing them, for
example, to identify people “vulnerable to [extremist] messaging—
people who were more prone to conspiratorial thinking or paranoid
ideation” and could be convinced to join the alt-right.100 The targeted
individuals often spread their misinformed beliefs across social media
channels, effectively creating a self-perpetuating propaganda
machine.101 Since 2016, microtargeting has become one prong102 in vast
campaigns to spread disinformation on social media by countries like
Venezuela, Bangladesh, Iran, Russia and China.103
Second, personal data can be used to identify and recruit U.S.
dissidents to serve as informants for foreign governments.104 After
major data breaches at Equifax, the Office of Personnel Management,
and Marriott were linked to the Chinese government, many in the
cyber intelligence community concluded that the Chinese were
building a database on U.S. citizens.105 Recent scholarship contends that
one purpose of this database is to target persons of interest who have
99. See supra Part I(B).
100. Terry Gross, Fresh Air: Whistleblower Explains How Cambridge Analytica Helped Fuel
U.S. ‘Insurgency,’ NPR (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/08/768216311/whistleblowerexplains-how-cambridge-analytica-helped-fuel-u-s-insurgency (describing how Cambridge
Analytica targeted “people prone to conspiratorial thinking” in disinformation campaigns).
101. Id.
102. Other methods include bots and trolls. See., e.g, How is Fake News Spread? Bots, People
Like You, Trolls and Microtargeting, CENTER FOR INFO. TECH. & SOC.,
https://www.cits.ucsb.edu/fake-news/spread.
103. Sheera Frenkel et al., Russia’s Playbook for Social Media Disinformation Has Gone
Global, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/31/technology/twitterdisinformation-united-states-russia.html (describing the growing use of microtargeting
techniques to spread disinformation in the U.S. and other countries); Kate Conger, Facebook and
Twitter Say China Is Spreading Disinfomation in Hong Kong, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/19/technology/hong-kong-protests-china-disinformationfacebook-twitter.html.
104. Ming S. Chen, China’s Data Collection on US Citizens: Implications, Risks, and
Solutions, 15 J. OF SCI. P. & GOVERNANCE 1, 1 (2019).
105. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., The Hyper-Personalization of War: Cyber, Big Data, and the
Changing Face of Conflict, 15 GEO. J OF INT’L AFF. 108, 110 (2014).
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access to confidential governmental information, and could be
persuaded or blackmailed to spy on the U.S. government.106
Collection of personal data also poses the risk that the information
could be used to extort intelligence officials or military servicemembers
for political favors.107 Hostile foreign actors could recover sensitive
personal information about servicemembers’ children, spouses, family
and friends, using the data collection techniques discussed above. Such
information could allow these actors to build detailed profiles on
government officials, including their childrens’ schools, spouse’s
workplaces, personal bank account information, etc. Those profiles
could then be used to “plot all kinds of actual malevolence . . . . or to
simply craft very precise threats toward their families” in order to
retrieve confidential information or create paranoia.108
Ultimately, the marketplace for data has inherent risks that cannot
be ameliorated through bans on individual applications or even backend regulation on companies. The personal data industry is too
interconnected and opaque for that. Even if a ban prevents one
company from providing data to a foreign government, there is nothing
stopping hostile actors from hacking into databases or buying that
information on the open market. No matter what path it takes,
Americans’ personal data in the hands of a hostile foreign government
poses a threat to our national security. The only way to ensure our
personal data stays out of the wrong hands is to limit its collection in
the first place.
III. A MISAPPLICATION OF THE IEEPA TO DATA PRIVACY
Given the breadth and severity of the personal data security risk,
one might think that a new administration would have imposed a broad
regulatory scheme to enhance data protection. However, the Trump
Administration criticized comprehensive legislation, and instead
adopted an ad hoc approach.109 In banning TikTok as described above,
President Trump did little to impact the broader problem, i.e., the
opacity of the data marketplace and its inability to prevent personal

106. See Chen, supra note 104, at 8 (describing how the database allows intelligence officials
to spot, assess, and develop potential recruits).
107. Dunlap, supra note 105 at 115.
108. Id.
109. See Mulligan, supra note 35, at 51–52 (describing how the Trump administration
perceived “regulator-focused pirvacy policies and check boxes” as only serving “a very small
number of users”).
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data from ending up in the wrong hands.
The use of the IEEPA, in particular, evinces a misunderstanding of
the threat. Accordingly, this Part will examine the IEEPA in its
application to cybersecurity issues stemming from TikTok. The use of
the IEEPA to regulate data privacy is inappropriate (and, arguably,
unlawful) for three reasons. First, the IEEPA was designed to combat
unusual and extraordinary threats, not the ongoing and widespread
data security crisis. Second, the TikTok ban violates the IEEPA
exclusion on “informational materials.” Finally, as a policy matter,
Congress should have a greater role in regulating data security than an
IEEPA framework would permit.
A. The IEEPA Was Not Intended to Apply to Widespread Threats
Using the IEEPA to combat ongoing threats contravenes its
legislative purpose. Employing IEEPA powers should be narrowly
tailored to respond to a “true” national emergency, an “unusual and
extraordinary threat.”110 Instead, Presidents have invoked the statute
broadly, and critics have recognized that the IEEPA is ripe for abuse.111
As one commentator noted, “[t]hese uses suggest that the statute can
and will be invoked whenever the President desires to draw on its broad
powers, whether or not there is a genuine emergency.”112 Despite this
overbroad usage, courts are reluctant to question a President’s
declaration of a national emergency.113
The first time the IEEPA was invoked was a true national
emergency. During the Iran hostage crisis, two specific events
constituted “unusual and extraordinary threat[s]” triggering President
Carter’s powers under the IEEPA: the taking of hostages by Iranian
students with the endorsement of the insurgent party in Iran and the
insurgent party’s threat to withdraw Iranian funds from U.S.

110. Trading With the Enemy Act Reform Legislaton: Hearing and Markup before the H.
Comm. on Int’l Rel. on H.R. 7738, 95th Cong. 14 (1977).
111. See Peter Harrell, The Right Way to Reform the U.S. President’s International Emergency
Powers, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/69388/the-right-way-toreform-the-u-s-presidents-international-emergency-powers/ (noting that the IEEPA’s broad
grant of power to the president may allow a quick governmental response in times of genuine
emergency, but that the statute’s breadth renders it easily abused).
112. Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L. J. 1385, 1415
(1989) (quoting Carter, International Economic Sanctions, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1159, 1235 (1987)).
113. See Koh, supra note 25, at 1313 (descrbing how the Court’s “decisions on the merits of
foreign affairs claims have enouraged a steady fllow of policymaking power from Congress to the
Executive”).
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institutions.114 As the House Report reviewing these events noted,
“[s]uch a triggering of the IEEPA . . . was certainly consistent with the
legislative history of that act.”115 In this case, the inciting incidents were
isolated and identifiable.
Although use of the IEEPA should be limited to true national
emergencies, oftentimes its application does not appear to meet the
threshold for an unusual and extraordinary threat, as required under
the statute. For example, multiple presidents have declared national
emergencies in order to reinstate export regulations that were initially
developed and passed by Congress.116 In particular, President Reagan
used the IEEPA to extend the Export Administration Act when
Congress failed to renew the Act itself.117 Commentators recognized
that classifying the renewal as a “national emergency” stretched the
standards for application of the IEEPA.118 Regardless, a district court
held that this did not contravene the statute because Congress had not
amended he IEEPA to prohibit that practice.119
President Trump’s ban on TikTok is far more similar to the latter
application of the IEEPA. If the ban were enacted, President Trump
would subvert the intent of the IEEPA. Declaring a national
emergency under such circumstances would serve no other purpose but
to further his own political agenda. Although ineffective personal data
privacy regulation does pose a grave national security threat, TikTok
itself is an insignificant fragment of that risk. TikTok alone cannot meet
the threshold of an unusual and extraordinary threat as required by the
IEEPA. Whereas the Carter Administration imposed appropriately
long-term remedies to confront an unusual emergency threat,120 the
Trump Administration proposes a short-term solution to an endemic
cybersecurity risk.
114. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON BANKING, FIN. & URB. AFF., 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., IRAN:
FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE HOSTAGE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, 1213 (Comm. Print
1981) (noting that President Carter froze Iranian assets in response to the “barbaric political
actions of the Iranian students” and the statement by an Iranian spokesman that Iran would
repudiate all U.S. debts and withdraw its funds from U.S. depository institutions).
115. Id. at 12.
116. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 21, at 41–42 (noting that President Reagan was the first to
use the IEEPA to extend export controls); see also Joel B. Harris & Jeffrey P. Bialos, The Strange
New World of United States Export Controls under the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 71, 81 (1985) (discussing President Reagan’s use of the IEEPA).
117. Id. at 82.
118. Id.
119. United States v. Groos, 616 F. Supp. 2d 777, 785 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
120. These “long-term remedies” include economic sanctions that, to this day, shape the
context of U.S.-Iran relations. See Casey et al., supra note 21, at 18–19.
THE
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Further, the use of the IEEPA to ban TikTok is questionable
because it insulates the President’s decision from judicial scrutiny and
obscures the scale and scope of the dangers of data mining. First, the
courts’ tendency to refuse review of IEEPA actions makes challenging
the ban particularly difficult. Given the broad discretion granted to the
President under IEEPA precedent, a court might refuse to hear
legitimate constitutional challenges on the grounds that invoking the
IEEPA raises a nonjusticiable political question.121 If that’s the case,
proponents of a comprehensive data privacy framework would have
little opportunity to oppose this ad hoc approach, and would require
Congress to pass alternative legislation undermining the executive
order before comprehensive legislation could be implemented.
More importantly, regulating TikTok under the guise of a national
emergency signals that TikTok is an isolated problem and obscures the
scale of the threat. As explained in Part II, the transfer of Americans’
personal data to hostile actors does pose a national security concern.
However, TikTok’s data mining practices do not pose an unusual and
extraordinary threat to Americans. Rather, the information TikTok
collects is typical of the industry writ large.122 Therefore, focusing a ban
on TikTok alone is ultimately a distraction from a broader national
security solution: tightening the regulation of what personal data could
be collected.123 It is vital that Americans fully understand the scope of
the cybersecurity threat so that comprehensive legislation can be
enacted to combat it.
B. The TikTok Ban Violates the IEEPA Carve-out on Personal
Communications and Informational Materials
The TikTok ban is improper under the IEEPA because IEEPA
specifically exempts “informational materials” and “personal
communications” from its reach. Known as the “Berman Amendment,”
the revision to the statute was meant to obviate First Amendment
challenges to IEEPA use:
The authority granted to the President by this section does not
121. See infra Part III(B) for a discussion of some possible challenges.
122. See Kevin Collier, TikTok a Privacy Threat? Sure, But So Are Most of Your Smartphone
Apps, NBC NEWS (July 13, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/tiktok-privacy-threatsure-so-are-most-your-smartphone-apps-n1233625 (noting that it is “the norm” for phone apps to
collect location data, usernames, phone numbers, device tupes, and more).
123. See Aaronson, supra note 71, at 1819 (observing that Canadian and German
governments have instead focused on regulating “where and how” data is stored rather than
banning individual apps).
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include the authority to regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly
. . . any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal
communication, which does not involve a transfer of anything of
value . . . . or the importation from any country, or the exportation
to any country, whether commercial or otherwise, regardless of
format or medium of transmission, of any information materials,
including but not limited to, publications, films, posters, phonograph
records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks,
CD ROMs, artworks, and news wire feeds.124

Although the examples of informational materials may seem out of
date, the legislative history of the Berman Amendment shows that
Congress had intended for these limitations to apply broadly. In a
House Report describing the purpose of the Amendment, the drafters
noted that
[T]he principle that no prohibitions should exist on imports to the
United States of ideas and information if their circulation is
protected by the First Amendment. That principle applies with
equal force to the exportation of ideas and information from this
country to the rest of the world. Accordingly, these sections also
exempt informational materials and publications from the export
restrictions that may be imposed under these acts.125

In Congress’s formulation, then, any information protected by
constitutional speech is excepted from the President’s authority under
the IEEPA. Congress has also expanded the exceptions under the
Amendment, noting that informational materials may include
technologies and software.126
However, judicial deference to the President might limit the scope
of this exception. A recent case interpreting the Amendment remarked,
“[w]ith the Berman Amendment . . . . Congress sought to ensure the
robust exchange of informational materials would not be unduly
inhibited . . . .”127 However, that same court upheld IEEPA regulation
of software on the narrow grounds that only informational materials

124. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b).
125. H.R. Rep. No. 100-40, Part . 3, at 113 (1987).
126. See 31 C.F.R § 560.418 (2009) (Iranian sanction regulations state that technology and
software transmitted to Iran would violate that sanction “unless that technology or software meets
the definition of information and informational materials in [the Berman Amendment] . . . .”).
127. See United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 586 (3d Cir. 2011). In this case, the
defendant developed a software which allowed users to plan and study chemical reactions. The
software was then sold to the state-sponsored National Petrochemical Company of Iran. Because
the software required tailoring to the end-user after sale, it was not “fully created and in existence”
at the point of sale, and therefore could be regulated under the IEEPA.
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“fully created and in existence” were subject to the exception.128
Because the software at issue was customizable, it was not “fully
created.”129 The court concluded that regulation of those materials is
“not sacrosanct” as a result of the Amendment.130 This holding
indicates that, although the Amendment restricts the President’s
IEEPA authority to some extent, deference to the executive likely
overrides certain applications of the exception.
The language and purpose of the Berman Amendment squarely
encompasses things like TikTok. TikTok clearly involves the
“exportation of ideas and information” from users in the United States
to users abroad, and vice-versa. As stated above, TikTok users produce
and share short-form videos on any topic—this is tantamount to the
“film” exception enumerated in the statute. These videos are the
products of users’ constitutionally protected speech. Indeed, this was
the very reason why a federal district court blocked the TikTok ban in
late September 2020.131
Depending on how broadly a court interprets the exception, it is
hard to imagine a ban on any app, not just TikTok, that would not
violate the Amendment. Consider, for example, a ban on WhatsApp, an
application that allows users to send text messages, video calls, images,
etc.132 Although WhatsApp was founded in the U.S., it has been
vulnerable to hackers, as evidenced by a recent spyware attack.133 Say,
hypothetically, that the hack was coordinated by a foreign government.
If President Trump had used his IEEPA powers to ban WhatsApp, the
ban would probably be challenged on Berman Amendment grounds.
WhatsApp, like many other apps, involves users exchanging ideas and
information—precisely what the exception is meant to protect.
To take an even broader perspective, a court might consider any
transfer of personal data to be protectable under the exception as an

128. Id.
129. Id. at 588.
130. Id. at 587.
131. TikTok Inc. v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-02658, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177250, at *16–17
(D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2020).
132. Chandra Steele, What Is WhatsApp? An Explainer, PCMAG (Feb. 20, 2014),
https://www.pcmag.com/news/what-is-whatsapp-an-explainer.
133. See Zak Doffman, WhatsApp Users Beware: This Stupidly Simple New Hack Puts You
(Jan.
25,
2020),
At
Risk—Here’s
What
You
Do,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2020/01/25/whatsapp-users-beware-this-stupidlysimple-new-hack-puts-you-at-riskheres-what-you-do/?sh=62047a5b1d76
(describing
a
WhatsApp vulnerability that allowed hackers to gain access to accounts by relying on users’
“susceptibility to social engineering”).
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expression of speech. Commentators and courts are divided over the
question of whether personal data is speech.134 Given the complexity of
these arguments, this debate is outside of the context of this Note.
Suffice it to say that if data is speech, the IEEPA cannot touch personal
data, and thus cannot be used to protect it.
C. Congress’s Role in Regulating Data Privacy Should Be Enhanced
As a policy matter, Congress should have a greater role in
regulating data security than the IEEPA framework allows. Although
the IEEPA was designed to enhance Congress’s role in foreign affairs,
it has had the opposite effect. Presidents have used the IEEPA to
impose unitary executive action while Congress has been sidelined.
Virtually none of the congressional oversight mechanisms in the
IEEPA is effective. The primary tool in the original version of the
IEEPA was a legislative veto of the President’s emergency declaration.
That provision states: “[t]he authorities described in subsection (a)(1)
may not continue to be exercised under this section if the national
emergency is terminated by the Congress by concurrent resolution . . . .
and if the Congress specifies in such concurrent resolution that such
authorities may not continue to be exercised under this section.”135
However, as a result of INS v. Chadha, which held that the legislative
veto violated constitutional separation of powers, Congress would
likely need a two-thirds majority (a veto-proof supermajority) to
“veto” an emergency declaration.136 In this era of hyper-partisanship, it
is highly unlikely that any vote could garner that much support.137
Congress itself is to blame for neglecting some of its supervisory
duties in this area. Although the IEEPA stipulates that Congress meet
every six months to discuss existing national emergencies, Congress has

134. Compare Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57 (2014) (arguing that
data is speech) with Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52
U.C.L.A. L. R. 1149 (2005) (arguing that data is not speech); Neil M. Richards, Why Data Privacy
Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501 (2015).
135. 50 U.S.C. § 1706(b) (2018).
136. See 462 U.S. 919, 935 (1983) (holding that Congress cannot void the exercise of power
by the executive branch through concurrent resolution, and can act only through bicameral
passage followed by presentment of the law to the President).
137. See Elizabeth Goitein, How Congress Is Pushing Back Against Trump’s Unprecedented
POST
(Sept.
25,
2020),
Use
of
Emergency
Powers,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/25/how-congress-is-pushing-back-againsttrumps-unprecedented-use-emergency-powers/ (noting that a veto-proof supermajority would
today be “nearly impossible to achieve”).
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not once fulfilled this requirement.138 Coupled with the courts’
hesitation to question the President’s emergency powers, the bloated
statute gives essentially limitless power to the President.
This lack of oversight is of concern to Congress. Currently, there are
two bipartisan bills pending in Congress that would reinstate the
oversight the enacting Congress intended. One of these proposals
would impose a 30-day period after a national emergency is declared
wherein Congress must vote to extend the emergency if they want it to
continue.139 As the sponsor of that proposal, Senator Mike Lee (R-UT)
notes, “[t]he problem is that emergency powers are vulnerable to abuse;
they can act as a cheat-code that undermines of system of separation of
powers and enables the president to bypass the difficult work of
enacting legislation.”140
In effect, the IEEPA allows the President unilateral control over
federal data privacy policy, unless Congress acts to implement its own
legislation. Under the IEEPA, President Trump could have banned all
applications that pose some sort of data security threat with origins
outside the U.S.141 That would include not just apps made in China, but
those made in Russia or any other OFAC-listed country.142 Not only
would that be a step too far, it’s unlikely to effectively address
widespread data security concerns.143
The security risks attendant to personal data protection are
important enough that Congress deserves a seat at the table. The
President should not unilaterally dictate policy, even if national security
issues are traditionally the province of the executive branch. Although
data privacy incidents implicate foreign affairs, the interdependencies
of online networks go beyond the foreign versus domestic binary. The
data protection problem is not raised by unique threat actors or foreign
adversaries, it is a far-reaching issue that has direct, domestic effects.

138. Elizabeth Goitein, The Alarming Scope of the President’s Emergency Powers, ATLANTIC
(Jan./Feb. 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/presidential-emergencypowers/576418/.
139. Assuring that Robust, Thorough, and Informed Congressional Leadership is Exercised
Over National Emergencies (ARTICLE ONE) Act, S. 764, 116th Cong. § 202(a) (2019).
140. Sen. Lee Introduces ARTICLE ONE Act to Reclaim Congressional Power, MIKE LEE:
U.S. SEN. FOR UTAH (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2019/3/sen-leeintroduces-article-one-act-to-reclaim-congressional-power.
141. Although in theory the Berman Amendment should prevent the President from banning
any application that trades in informational materials, the fact that President Trump attempted
to ban TikTok indicates that interpretations of what may qualify under the exception can differ.
142. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
143. See supra Part II(A)–(C).
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Therefore, the traditional foreign policy principle delegating authority
to the President simply does not apply here.144 Because the IEEPA
codifies that principle, its use is inappropriate when applied to personal
data privacy.
Instead, Congress needs to intervene. Only Congress has the ability
to adopt the broad legislative reforms required to protect American’s
personal data,145 and only Congress can unify fragmented federal and
state law to bring the U.S. in accord with its international peers.146 The
alternative, entrusting data protection to industry and the executive
branch, will leave U.S. citizens’ personal data and the nation as a whole
vulnerable to attack.
IV. FEDERAL DATA PRIVACY REGULATION
Relying on the IEEPA to protect Americans’ data privacy is an
untenable solution. Although the government is not wrong to view the
data privacy threat that TikTok and other similar services present as a
national security risk, threats to data privacy are ubiquitous and cannot
be dealt with through unitary executive action under the IEEPA. A
comprehensive problem requires a comprehensive solution.
Reviewing the deficiencies of the IEEPA raises the question: Is
there a way to regulate personal data that (1) sufficiently tackles the
breadth of the cybersecurity issue, (2) avoids First Amendment free
speech challenges, and (3) incorporates both congressional and
executive branch concerns? Any effective legislation would also need
to address the problem at its source—i.e. what data can be collected
and what companies can do with that data.
California’s Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) provides a model for
such national legislation.147 Although the CCPA is costly and raises
144. Much has been written about separation of powers in the realm of foreign affairs.
Judicial interpretations have generally upheld the President’s broad discretion in this area. See,
e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (holding that “the
President [is] is the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations”);
but see Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (stating that “[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is
uncertain”).
145. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
146. See Mulligan, supra note 35, at 3 (“This fragmented legal landscape coupled with
concerns that existing federal laws are inadequate has led many stakeholders to argue that the
federal government should assume a larger role in data protection policy.”).
147. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100 (West 2020).
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potential federalism issues, it exemplifies a much-needed effort to
proactively regulate data privacy. The CCPA protects consumer privacy
at the point of collection, regulates what companies may do with
personal data, and avoids the defects of an ad hoc method. Although
the CCPA is not a complete solution, it provides a framework for
workable federal legislation.
A. The CCPA
The CCPA began as a 2017 ballot initiative for sweeping changes to
existing privacy law. The purpose of the bill was to protect individuals’
“inalienable” right to privacy, fundamental to which was the “ability of
individuals to control the use, including the sale, of their personal
information.”148
The legislation, which took effect in early 2020, provides that any
business operating in California that meets certain criteria must comply
with several regulations relating to personal data security.149 First,
businesses that sell personal data (including data brokers) must give
consumers the right to opt out of the sale if they request.150 Second,
consumers can request that businesses disclose whatever personal
information they have collected, why they collected it, and what was
done with the information.151 Consumers are also afforded a private
right of action in the event of a data breach.152 Finally, consumers can
request that businesses delete their personal data, and businesses must
respond within 45 days.153 Although not directly part of the CCPA,
California law also requires that data brokers register with the state,
another effort to increase transparency.154 In providing consumers the
tools to manage their data, the CCPA takes the initial step in reducing
the ways that businesses can use that data. In doing so, the CCPA aims
to protect consumer privacy at its source: the collection stage.
On a federal level, the enactment of the CCPA drew renewed

148. A.B. 375, 2019 Cal. St. Assemb. (Cal. 2019).
149. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.105 –140(c) (West 2020) (“The CCPA applies to for-profit
businesses that do business in California and meet any of the following: have a gross annual
revenue of over $25 million; buy, receive, or sell the personal information of 50,000 or more
California residents, households, or devices; or derive 50% or more of their annual revenue from
selling California residents’ personal information.”).
150. Id. at § 1798.05(a).
151. Id. at § 1798.110(a).
152. Id. at § 1798.150(a).
153. Id. at §1798.130(a)(2)(A).
154. Id. at §§ 1798.99.80–88.
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attention to data privacy.155 Several bipartisan legislative proposals
modeled on the CCPA have been introduced.156 Despite broad
agreement on the need to create a federal data protection law, these
recently introduced and past legislative proposals have been held up in
Congress.157 To appreciate why requires an understanding of the policy
debate at the heart of these issues: the primacy of data privacy versus
the economic and political risks in enacting those policies.
First, lobbyists decried the CCPA’s financial costs.158 Initial CCPA
compliance for companies in California was projected to cost up to $55
billion.159 The costs of implementation and compliance on a national
level would, of course, be drastically higher. And beyond the immediate
financial costs are potential future costs to the advertising industry. By
limiting access to personal data, targeted advertising may be similarly
curtailed.160 Limiting behavioral advertising may also have significant
downstream effects on the economy.161 Although those financial
consequences deserve due consideration, they simply cannot outweigh
the necessity of comprehensive data privacy legislation. Though the
financial costs of compliance would be significant, the impacts of not
complying transcend purely economic concerns. Without personal data
privacy protection, we risk a repeat of the Cambridge Analytica
incident, of further data breaches, and of greater threats to our national
security.162
Second, consumer privacy advocates protested that the CCPA did
155. See David McCabe, Congress and Trump Agreed They Want a National Privacy Law. It
TIMES
(Oct.
1,
2019),
Is
Nowhere
in
Sight.,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/01/technology/national-privacy-law.html (“[Tech] industry
groups flooded Washington with a clear message meant to neutralize California’s rules entirely.
Congress should pass a national privacy law, they said, and include a provision superseding any
state legislation on the issue.”).
156. See generally Setting an American Framework to Ensure Data Access, Transparency,
and Accountability (SAFE DATA) Act, S. 3663, 116th Cong. (2020); see also Data Broker
Accountability and Transparency Act of 2020, H.R. 6675, 116th Cong. (2020).
157. See McCabe, supra note 151 and accompanying text.
158. Id.
159. Caitlin Chin, Highlights: The GDPR and CCPA as Benchmarks For Federal Privacy
INST.
(Dec.
19,
2019),
Legislation,
BROOKINGS
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/12/19/highlights-the-gdpr-and-ccpa-asbenchmarks-for-federal-privacy-legislation/.
160. See Theodore F. Claypoole, Will CCPA Kill Advertising as We Know It?, 10 NAT’L L.
REV. 1, 2 (2020) (noting that the regulation could allow consumers to avoid targeted advertising
through browser plug-ins.).
161. See id.(“Data is the currency of this advertising world, and the CCPA if strictly enforced
could cripple many of the advances made in the past 30 years.”).
162. See supra Part II(C) for a discussion of how national security concerns include the spread
of propaganda and targeting of intelligence and military officials.
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not go far enough in protecting personal data.163 These activists
asserted that the CCPA would not adequately protect consumer data
because it shifts much of the burden onto consumers to affirmatively
exercise their rights.164 In that sense, the CCPA does not constrain data
collection at all.165 However, this argument misses the point of the
CCPA. The legislation was always meant to act as an initial step towards
privacy protection, rather than as a sweeping defense of consumer
rights.166 And still, the CCPA is widely considered the most extensive
data protection regime in the United States.167 In fact, the CCPA’s
status as a baseline measure has already been proven. In November
2020, California voters approved the California Privacy Rights Act
(CPRA), which expands the CCPA’s opt-out right and private right of
action, and institutes a privacy regulatory body and a right to correct
personal information under the CCPA.168
Finally, those concerned that the CCPA might provide a basis for
federal legislation wondered how a “federal CCPA” might preempt
existing state privacy law. Several states have enacted legislation similar
to the CCPA,169 but may differ in some important respects.170 Here, a
federal CCPA could provide a floor, rather than a ceiling, for state law.
In other words, federal legislation would preempt existing state law, but
only to the extent that state law fails to meet the standards outlined by
the CCPA.171
163. See e.g., GDPR & CCPA: Opt-ins, Consumer Control, and the Impact on Competition
and Innovation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 1 (2019) (Statement
of Michelle Richardson, Director, Privacy & Data Center for Democracy & Tech.) (“Privacy selfmanagement alone is neither scalable nor practical for the individual. Burdening individuals with
more and more granular decisions, absent some reasonable boundaries, will not provide the
systemic changes we need.”).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See Revisiting the Need for Data Privacy Legislation: Hearing Before the S. Comm on
Com., Sci. and Transp., 116th Cong. 2 (2020) (Statement of Xavier Becerra, Attorney General of
the State of California) (“Like any law, the CCPA is not perfect, but it is an excellent first step.”).
167. Id.
168. See The California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, CA Proposition 24 (2020).
169. Currently, only Virginia and Nevada have passed legislation similar to the CCPA, but
legislation is pending in 24 other states. See Sarah Rippy, US State Comprehensive Privacy Law
Comparison, IAPP WESTIN RESEARCH CTR., https://iapp.org/resources/article/statecomparison-table/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2021).
170. See Mulligan, supra note 35, at 37 (noting that the CCPA is particularly comprehensive
relative to many other states’ laws).
171. Arguably, this preemption approach would fail to unify state and federal law, as no
single national data privacy standard would exist. See Cameron F. Kerry and John B. Morris, Jr.,
Preemption: A Balanced National Approach to Protecting all Americans’ Privacy, LAWFARE
(June
18,
2020),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/preemption-balanced-national-approachprotecting-all-americans-privacy.
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B. The CCPA Overcomes the Deficiencies of an Ad Hoc Method
Implementing legislation similar to the CCPA would also help
address the three deficiencies of the IEEPA method: that ad hoc
solutions do not comprehensively protect consumer privacy, any
outright ban would encounter First Amendment challenges, and it
permits unitary executive action when the decisionmaking process
should include Congress.
First, applying the CCPA on a federal level would represent an
initial effort at combating the dangers of the data marketplace: namely,
system hacks, data sharing with foreign governments, and selling
personal data to hostile actors.172 To limit the likelihood of a hack, the
CCPA gives consumers a private right of action in the event of a data
breach. On a national level, this would encourage businesses to
implement data protection measures on their own, such as limiting the
amount of personal data collected, and deleting that data automatically
when it is no longer needed. Also, the CCPA reduces the risk of data
ending up in the hands of hostile actors because the Act gives
consumers the right to limit the data they provide and sell. In short, the
CCPA gives consumers dominion over their data.
Furthermore, a national CCPA would not implicate First
Amendment issues. Under the CCPA, consumers are free to create and
share whatever information they want—they just have more control
over where it ends up. Further, courts have recognized that a certain
amount of privacy aids free expression and free association.173 In that
sense, encouraging basic data protection could safeguard against these
concerns.
Finally, implementing the CCPA would require the cooperation of
Congress. Given the patchwork of data privacy laws across the country,
it is particularly important that a federal law harmonizes these
approaches, understanding both industry and consumer considerations.
Only Congress is suited to do that. As state data privacy laws gain
momementum and bipartisan support for a federal approach builds, the
time is ripe for Congress to enact meaningful legislation.
Although a federal version of the CCPA would not eliminate all of
172. See supra Part II(A)-(C).
173. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (holding that
“[a]nonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority . . . . It thus exemplifies the purpose
behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular
individuals from retaliation—and their ideas from suppression—at the hand of an intolerant
society”).
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the concerns presented by the mining of personal data, it is a solid
foundation to initially address personal data privacy issues. Legislators
must keep in mind that as time passes, the more personal data is
collected and the more these risks are exacerbated. Therefore,
Congress must act swiftly. Implementing legislation based on the
existing CCPA framework represents the most efficient route to begin
protecting Americans’ personal data.
CONCLUSION
The use of the IEEPA to ban TikTok, an ad hoc solution directed
by the President, represents a flawed approach for the future of our
national data privacy policy: the approach has been shown to be legally
untenable and does not provide a comprehensive solution. Banning
individual apps is insufficient to tackle the opacity of the personal data
marketplace, the amount of data that is collected, and the many ways
that data may be compromised. Inadequate data protection will
continue to pose the risk that individual Americans’ personal data ends
up in the wrong hands. An ambitious effort to develop comprehensive
data privacy protection must be enacted, based on the foundation
provided by the CCPA. The longer Congress waits to implement this
legislation, the more the nation risks exposure to further unforeseen
privacy attacks.

